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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this research is to investigate the shift of the homeland security 
landscape in response to rapid urbanization and integration of technology in cities. 
Governments and municipalities are rushing toward the utilization of advanced 
technologies to solve challenges dealing with urban expansion and the increase of 
high-tech threats. Privacy concerns and vulnerabilities in associated “smart city” design 
are becoming apparent and related to the adoption of new security measures. This thesis 
answers the question: How will the transformation of Homeland Security terrain, 
influenced by smart city infrastructure, affect how governments deliver services and 
security to citizens? The effects are revealed through the use of a comparative analysis 
between Singapore and Denmark, highlighting the governmental composition, social 
dynamics and policy approaches involved with smart city development. The comparison 
discloses that the effectiveness and implementation of a smart city design in part depends 
on the level of collaboration, training, and policy formulation in security planning that 
occurs among public-private, academic and citizen stakeholders. The results suggest that 
stakeholders should be involved from the beginning in smart city planning. Their initial 
involvement allows for security and privacy issues to be mitigated beforehand. It also 
encourages the public’s trust of government services that are delivered in an advanced 
technological city environment. 
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A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis answers the question: How will the transformation of Homeland 
Security terrain, influenced by “Smart City” infrastructure, affect how government deliver 
services and security to citizens? 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
“Smart Cities” are defined by William Eggers and John Skowron as “physical 
assets networked via sensor technology that generate streams of valuable data.”1 Houbing 
Song et al. points out that the aforementioned relies on a complex architecture that supports 
the interconnection among hardware, software, sensors, information, meters and advanced 
technology.2  
Song et al. reports that smart cities interlink Information and Communications 
Technology (ICT) with Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) in an urban environment, enabling 
machines to communicate, coordinate, and regulate infrastructure, promote the delivery of 
services, and provide city governance to enhance the well-being of citizens.3 Song et al. 
emphasizes that smart cities by design serve the purpose of providing economic and social 
sustainability by managing resource consumption, reducing pollution, and optimizing city 
functions around an urban community’s needs and values.4  
Song et al. explains that smart cities help in the following ways. First, they support 
security by coordinating city lighting and surveillance devices to help prevent crime.5 
                                                 
1 William Eggers and John Skowron, Forces of Change: Smart Cities (New York, NY: Deloitte 
Touche Tohmatsu Limited, 2018), https://www2.deloitte.com/insights/us/en/focus/smart-city/
overview.html. 
2 Houbing Song, Stefano S. Bregni, Ravi Srinivasan, Tamim Sookoor and Sabina Jeschke, Smart 
Cities: Foundations and Principles (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2017), 3. 
3 Song, Bregni, Srinivasan, Sookoor and Jeschke, Smart Cities: Foundations and Principles, 2. 
4 Song, Bregni, Srinivasan, Sookoor and Jeschke, Smart Cities: Foundations and Principles, 3. 
5 Song, Bregni, Srinivasan, Sookoor and Jeschke, Smart Cities: Foundations and Principles, 5. 
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Energy consumption by the public is reduced when smart grid technologies are employed 
to control and manage the balance between renewable energy and fossil fuels.6 The 
mobility of businesses and citizens is enhanced by smart cities coordination of geographic 
information and transportation modes that help reduce pollution, traffic congestion, and 
noise.7 Smart city network technology increases access to education for all social classes 
to help communities develop new skills, and adapt to job markets and an evolving 
economy.8 Smart cities encourage smart governance by synchronizing and expanding 
political participation and online public services to residents.9  
Song et al. alleges that part of the problem with smart cities is that they are not 
adequately equipped to defend against data breaches, or have an adequate design 
architecture that integrates technologies in order to prevent issues with network 
functionality, inefficiencies and failures.10 Kathryn Stephens defers to security consultant 
Tony Flick’s statement that “Smart Grid development has become a ‘gold rush’ to get 
government money, but when industry rushes new technologies to market, they are more 
likely to be flawed and vulnerable.”11 Fixing these problems by accelerating the 
advancement of security measures is the first step in preparing smart cities for the 
protection of citizens.  
Digital communities require a secure environment safeguarded by a homeland 
security terrain capable of protecting the distribution of public services in the form of 
healthcare, energy, transportation and law enforcement. However, the problem of 
inadequate homeland security measures is due to the rapid integration of technology in 
                                                 
6 Song, Bregni, Srinivasan, Sookoor and Jeschke, Smart Cities: Foundations and Principles, 5. 
7 Song, Bregni, Srinivasan, Sookoor and Jeschke, Smart Cities: Foundations and Principles, 5. 
8 Song, Bregni, Srinivasan, Sookoor and Jeschke, Smart Cities: Foundations and Principles, 6. 
9 Song, Bregni, Srinivasan, Sookoor and Jeschke, Smart Cities: Foundations and Principles, 6. 
10 Song, Bregni, Srinivasan, Sookoor and Jeschke, Smart Cities: Foundations and Principles, 10. 
11 Kathryn Stephens, U.S. Smart Grid Security: How Are We Doing? (Smithfield, VA: National 
Security Cyberspace Institute, 2011), http://www.nsci-va.org/WhitePapers/2011-10-19-
SmartGrid%20Security-Stephens.pdf. 
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cities that are creating vulnerabilities within the cyber-physical domain related to shortfalls 
in interoperability, resource allocation, and standardization.  
In addition, these homeland security landscape problems also stem from 
deficiencies in public-private collaboration, information sharing, and the absence of a 
comprehensive policy for a smart city framework. Solving these problems is difficult 
because it requires complex public-private planning and agreement of policies, strategy, 
and the retrofitting of security design features that are compatible between old and new 
technologies without negatively affecting civil liberties. 
Insufficient protective measures and vulnerabilities in smart cities are creating 
national security concerns. For example, in 2007, the President’s Council of Advisors on 
Science and Technology raised awareness about the national security and critical 
infrastructure vulnerabilities of weak network access points for hackers to exploit, potential 
“black swan” attacks, and the overlapping of outdated architecture’s susceptibility to 
failure from natural disasters.12 According to the Project Grey Goose Report on Critical 
Infrastructure, “There have been at least 120 instances of successful attacks, some of which 
are documented in the report and date back to 2001.”13 The Project Grey Goose Report on 
Critical Infrastructure goes on to say that “state and/or non-state sponsored hackers from 
the Russian Federation of Independent States, Turkey, and China as the main threats to 
targeting and hacking into energy providers and other critical infrastructure networks.”14 
The report anticipates a dramatic increase in attacks as the U.S. critical infrastructure 
domain incorporates more wireless and IP-based systems.15 
The trust and privacy of citizens are as vital as national security when it comes to 
the usage of technology for the access of public services. For example, the automation 
                                                 
12 John H Marburger et al., Leadership Under Challenge: Information Technology R&D in a 
Competitive World. An Assessment of the Federal Networking and Information Technology R&D Program 
(Washington, DC: White House, 2007), https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a474709.pdf. 
13 Kelley J. Higgins, “Spike In Power Grid Attacks Likely In Next 12 Months,” Informa PLC Informa 
UK Limited, February 19, 2010, https://www.darkreading.com/vulnerabilities---threats/spike-in-power-
grid-attacks-likely-in-next-12-months/d/d-id/1132982. 
14 Higgins, “Spike In Power Grid Attacks Likely In Next 12 Months.” 
15 Higgins, “Spike In Power Grid Attacks Likely In Next 12 Months.” 
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and connectivity of Smart Healthcare systems provide remote virtual assistance and 
services to patients.16  Cyber criminals are capable of penetrating medical devices and 
information systems by using ransomware and software for the collection of personal 
health information.17 The compromise of citizen’s privacy in smart cities can cause a 
lack of trust in public institutions; rendering public services unusable.18 
The sharing of information between government and industry is critical for ensuring 
the protection of smart communities. Several presidential policies have been enacted since 
the Clinton Administration to encourage information sharing between government and the 
private sector.19 From these policies the Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISAC) 
and Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations (ISAO) were established for the 
purpose of “exchanging threat, vulnerability and intrusion information” on a voluntary 
basis between government and industry.20 However, companies engage in strategic 
interactions to prevent leakages of information to avoid negative marketing campaigns in 
order to avoid losing market share value and to maintain a competitive advantage within 
their sector.21 The lack of information sharing and cooperation between government and 
industry makes it difficult for security agencies to effectively assess and respond in real 
time to threats within the smart city domain.  
Smart cities in other countries are currently in advance stages of development. They 
are demonstrating various strategies and lessons learned in how government plays a role in 
providing security and access to public services in an evolving digital ecosystem. The U.S. 
                                                 
16 Mohamad Amin Hasbini et al., Smart Cities Appeal and 15 Things That Should Not Go Wrong 
(n.p.: securingsmartcities.org, 2017), https://securingsmartcities.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/SSC-15-
things-v1.3.pdf. 
17 Mohamad Amin Hasbini et al., Smart Cities Appeal And 15 Things That Should Not Go Wrong. 
18 National Science and Technology Council, The National Privacy Research Strategy (Washington, 
DC: Whitehouse, 2016), https://www.nitrd.gov/pubs/NationalPrivacyResearchStrategy.pdf. 
19   Meilin He, Laura Devine, and Jun Zhuang, “Perspectives on Cybersecurity Information Sharing 
Among Multiple Stakeholders Using a Decision‐Theoretic Approach,” Risk Analysis 38, no. 2 (February 
2018): 215, https://doi.org/10.1111/risa.12878. 
20 He, Devine and Zhuang, “Perspectives on Cybersecurity Information Sharing Among Multiple 
Stakeholders Using a Decision‐Theoretic Approach,” 216. 
21 He, Devine and Zhuang, “Perspectives on Cybersecurity Information Sharing Among Multiple 
Stakeholders Using a Decision‐Theoretic Approach,” 221. 
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can use smart city strategies from cities outside the U.S. as a model for solving its 
challenges in finding a comprehensive strategy for public-private collaboration, public-
private information sharing, technology integration and a smart city framework. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review calls attention to the potential benefits and vulnerabilities that 
come from the restructuring of the homeland security environment around technology, 
services, information and human behavior. Numerous scholarly, governmental, and peer-
reviewed publications exist annotating the difficulties evolving in response to the 
convergence of technology, society, and homeland security climate. The majority of the 
literature focuses on the troubles facing the political and legal terrain. To further the 
research and analysis efforts in this thesis, the following categories were selected: checks 
and balances, citizen’s right to privacy, electronic government (e-government) and big data 
in relation to “Smart City” infrastructure.  
1. Checks and Balances 
There have been numerous studies to investigate the concept of checks and 
balances. Some scholars argue that the separation of powers by legislative function impels 
three branches of government in the balancing of power, therefore preventing tyranny.22 
According to Robert Pushaw, the federalists believed that the separation of powers “preserv 
[es] liberty by checking and balancing governmental authority in support of protecting the 
rule of law.”23 Some political theorists, like M. J. C. Vile, claim that checks and balances 
are based on the separation of agencies (executive, legislative, and judicial branches), each 
of which carries distinct sets of values, interests, and procedures with internal mechanisms 
that inherently prevent the rise of a “single all-embracing agency of government.”24  
                                                 
22 Richard Albert, “The Separation of Higher Powers,” SMU LAW REVIEW 65, no. 1 (July 2012): 69, 
https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1407&context=lsfp. 
23 Robert Jr. Pushaw, “Justiciability and Separation of Powers: a Neo-Federalist Approach.” Cornell 
Law Review 81, no. 2 (January, 1996): 502, https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=2592&context=clr. 
24 M. J. C. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers. 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 
1998), 16–18, Liberty Fund, Inc. 
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Others claim that a system of checks of balances is part of a greater social contract 
where voters forgo some liberties in exchange for government’s protection of people’s 
rights. Hints towards governmental checks and balances are conveyed in Aristotle’s 
political theory.25 He describes how the constitution is an agreement between citizens and 
politicians for “organizing the offices of the city-state” 26 for the purpose of establishing 
laws through institutions for the “common advantage” of all citizens.27 Michael Warren 
notes that in the 18th century, Charles Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu’s theory of 
separation of powers served as the cornerstone for James Madison’s drafting of the U.S. 
Constitution and the embedding of a system of checks and balances as the essential 
component for safeguarding the people’s liberty.28  
Daron Acemoglu, James A Robinson, and Ragnar Torvik conducted research on 
the concept of “equilibrium checks and balances” and identified a political scale that can 
be influenced by the elite or poor voters of a democratic society.29 They assert that well 
organized elite and poor groups of voters undermine checks and balances through lobbying 
and bribing to influence the reduction of “politician’s rents” and to encourage politicians 
to act in the groups favor at the expense of the majority of voters.30 The National Bureau 
of Economic Research group found that judicial checks and balances ensure greater 
economic and political freedom by preventing the legislature and executive branch from 
acting in self-interest.31  
                                                 
25 Fred Miller, “Aristotle’s Political Theory in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,” 
Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, November 7, 2017, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
win2017/entries/aristotle-politics/. 
26 Miller, “Aristotle’s Political Theory in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.” 
27 Miller, “Aristotle’s Political Theory in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.” 
28 “America’s Survival Guide,” Mill City Press, Inc., Accessed July 11, 2019, 
http://www.americassurvivalguide.com/montesquieu.php. 
29 Daron Acemoglu, James A Robinson, and Ragnar Torvik, “Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and 
Balances?” (working paper, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2011), 37, https://www.nber.org/
papers/w17293.pdf. 
30Acemoglu, Robinson, and Torvik, “Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances?” 
31Acemoglu, Robinson, and Torvik, “Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances?” 
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Some constitutional scholars, like Frank Vibert, claim that contemporary unelected 
technocrats and institutions form a new kind of separation of powers system at the domestic 
and international levels.32 The assertion is that unelected groups provide information to 
citizens in a democratic society that is superior to the factual information provided by 
governments; this allows citizens to check politicians’ motives and enable voters to 
influence policy formulation in an alternative way.33  
An increasing area of literature offered by scholars like Albert Meijer have studied 
the social, political and technical interactions in the handling of data as a key factor in the 
balancing of power between communities, companies, and politicians in smart city 
governance.34 Meijer studied public governance of smart cities and discovered that the 
power balancing mechanisms depend on the combining of social, political and technical 
features encourages citizen involvement in decision-making about digital infrastructure 
development.35  
In a 2007 congressional hearing before the Judiciary Committee, representatives 
argued that warrantless surveillance authorized through the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act fundamentally defeats the check and balance constraints, violating U.S. 
citizen’s right to privacy and denying their right to search and seizure.36  
Liberal theorists, like Paul Starr, claim that democratic liberalism infers a society 
supported by a constitution that outlines a system of checks and balances.37  According to 
                                                 
32 Frank Vibert, The Rise of the Unelected: Democracy and the New Separation of Powers 
(Cambridge, UNITED KINGDOM: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 166, ProQuest.  
33 Vibert, The Rise of the Unelected: Democracy and the New Separation of Powers, 167.  
34 Albert Meijer, “Datapolis: A Public Governance Perspective on ‘Smart Cities,’” Perspectives on 
Public Management and Governance 1, no. 3 (August, 2018): 195–206, https://doi.org/10.1093/ppmgov/
gvx017. 
35 Meijer, “Datapolis: A Public Governance Perspective on ‘Smart Cities,’” 204.  
36 Warrantless Surveillance and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act : the Role of Checks and 
Balances in Protecting American’s Privacy Rights. Pt. II : Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary, 
House of Representatives, 110 Cong., 1st Sess., September 18, 2007, 1. 
37 Paul Starr, “Liberalism and the Discipline of Power,” in Freedom’s Power: The True Force of 
Liberalism (Basic Books, April 2007), 18, Princeton.edu. 
8 
Starr, institutional mechanisms and participation in elections helps prevent state power 
from becoming despotic.38  
From a global perspective, well known international relations theorists use 
neorealism to describe how power is checked and balanced between nations within the 
international community through security or military expansion in the interest of the state 
at the expense of personal liberties.39 Many experts contend, however, that neorealism falls 
short in explaining the influence individuals have for reigning in the government’s power 
in a liberal democracy.40  
2. Privacy 
Many scholars throughout history have conducted ample research on the subject of 
privacy. In 1978, Richard Posner wrote from an economic theory perspective of privacy 
that “the strongest defenders of privacy usually define the individual’s right to privacy as 
the right to control the flow of information about him.”41  
Some scholars, like Alexandra Rengel, assert that privacy is an inherent value that 
is comparable to love, friendship and trust.42 Edward Bloustein equates the protection of a 
person’s personality with the protection of a person’s privacy, independence, and 
dignity.43  
Rengel claims that privacy and security are a balancing act to protect American 
society as a whole. The assumption is that in an Internet age the accumulation of personal 
                                                 
38 Starr, “Liberalism and the Discipline of Power,”18. 
39 Charles W. Kegley, Shannon L. Blanton, World Politics: Trend and Transformation, 13th ed. 
(Wadsworth: Cengage Learning, 2010), 70, https://hostnezt.com/cssfiles/internationalrelations/
World%20Politics%20Trend%20and%20Transformation%202010%20to%202011%20Edition%20By%20
Charles%20William%20Kegley.pdf. 
40 Starr, Liberalism and the Discipline of Power,” in Freedom’s Power: The True Force of Liberalism, 
17.  
41 Richard A. Posner, “An Economic Theory Of Privacy,” AEI Journal On Government And Society 
(2008): 20, https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511625138. 
42 Alexandra Rengel, Privacy in the 21st Century (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013), 32, 
ProQuest. 
43 Rengel, Privacy in the 21st Century, 32. 
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data by public-private organizations may be used as justification for compromising 
individual privacy in support of national security.44 In other words, the security of society 
as a whole benefit when individuals give up a share of their privacy.45  
France Belanger and Robert Crossler conducted privacy attitudes research. They 
found that the usage of fair information practices (FIP) in the management of people’s 
information mitigated online users’ privacy concerns to the point that they were more likely 
to provide personal information and less likely to take precautions in protecting their 
privacy.46 They also found that trust for Internet users to have a mediating effect on 
[consumer’s] relationship between privacy concerns and willingness of online 
transactions.”47  
In 2017, Susan Athey, Christian Catalini, and Catherine Tucker introduced the 
“Digital Privacy Paradox” experiment at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) was 
conducted on a group of students concerning digital privacy choices.48 The experiment 
revealed in Athey, Catalini and Tucker’s research state in part that, “whereas people say 
they care about privacy, they are willing to relinquish private data quite easily when 
incentivized to do so.”49  
                                                 
44 Rengel, Privacy in the 21st Century, 61. 
45 Rengel, Privacy in the 21st Century, 61. 
46 France Bélanger and Robert E. Crossler, “Privacy in the Digital Age: A Review of Information 
Privacy Research in Information Systems,” MIS Quarterly 35, no. 4 (December 2011): 1021, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/41409971. 
47 Bélanger and Crossler, “Privacy in the Digital Age: A Review of Information Privacy Research in 
Information Systems,” 1021. 
48 Susan Athey, Christian Catalini, and Catherine Tucker, “The Digital Privacy Paradox: Small 
Money, Small Costs, Small Talk,” (working paper, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2017), 1, 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w23488.pdf. 
49 Athey, Catalini, and Tucker, “The Digital Privacy Paradox: Small Money, Small Costs, Small 
Talk.” 
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It has recently been demonstrated by Reinhold Kesler, Michael Kimmer, and 
Patrick Schulte that mobile app developers over time increasingly adopt personally 
intrusive data collections tactics towards its users.50  
In 2012, a congressional hearing was held on the implications of facial recognition 
technology on privacy and civil liberties.51 From an individualistic standpoint, Maneesha 
Mithal argued that a citizen’s facial images can be used by unrestrained public-private 
entities to uniquely identify unsuspecting persons for profit or prosecution.52 Furthermore, 
government representatives argue that facial images are the key to unlocking personal 
information in part: social network profiles, names, and a person’s movements.53 Facial 
images allow strangers to access tons of personal information in seconds about citizens 
from a distance.54 
3. Electronic Government  
Technology is playing a greater role in service functions extended by government, 
bridging the divide between public-private sectors when it comes to the intermediate 
distribution of public services. However, the literature does little in addressing the 
importance of human behavior’s role in effective e-government implementation. The 
literature reveals areas of opportunities and barriers generated by e-government platforms.  
Christopher Reddick describes electronic government (e-government) as the usage 
of Information-Communication Technology (ICT) to facilitate cheaper and efficient access 
                                                 
50 Reinhold Kesler, Michael F. Kummer, and Patrick Schulte, Chloe Reichel, “Mobile Applications 
and Access to Private Data: The Supply Side of the Android Ecosystem,” (working paper, Centre for 
European Economic Research, 2017), 19, https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3106571. 
51 What Facial Recognition Technology Means for Privacy and Civil Liberties Hearing Before the 
Subcommittee on Privacy Technology and the Law of the Committee on the Judiciary United States 
Senate, 112 Cong. (2012), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-112shrg86599/pdf/CHRG-
112shrg86599.pdf. 
52 H.R., What Facial Recognition Technology Means for Privacy and Civil Liberties. 
53 H.R., What Facial Recognition Technology Means for Privacy and Civil Liberties. 
54 H.R., What Facial Recognition Technology Means for Privacy and Civil Liberties. 
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of online services to the public, businesses, and governmental entities.55 Tax preparation 
and healthcare are examples of web-based tools used to enhance the lives of citizens. 
Some scholarly writings examine the barriers that are limiting public access to these 
online programs. Mary Schmeida and Ramona McNeal found that the digital divide can be 
attributed to inequalities in Internet access, technological skills, and psychological barriers 
among the poor, young (Millennials) and elderly (Baby Boomers).56 They go on to say 
that these inequalities can be limited with government policies and programs.57 Schmeida 
and McNeal used a “multivariate regression analysis and individual level data”58 to answer 
the question, “how successful have government efforts been to bring underserved 
Americans online to Medicare and Medicaid public health insurance information?”‘59 
Additionally, their research found that government’s role can enhance the public’s access 
to health insurance programs by providing Internet based information on Medicare 
eligibility criteria, enrollment guidelines, and public health service centers.60 
Scholars write about factors confronting the effective installation of e-government 
amenities and essential components for the shaping of citizens’ behavior and of a digital 
ecosystem. The existence and availability of technology for public use is not enough to 
attract citizen interaction; some individuals need encouragement to entice their 
participation.  
                                                 
55 Christopher G. Reddick, Comparative E-Government (New York: Springer Science+Business 
Media, LLC, 2010), 5, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-6536-3_5. 
56 Mary Schmeida and Ramona McNeal, “Bridging the Inequality Gap to Accessing Medicare and 
Medicaid Information Online: An Empirical Analysis of E-government Success 2002 through 2010,” In E-
Government Success around the World: Cases, Empirical Studies, and Practical Recommendations, ed. J. 
Ramon Gil-Garcia, (Hershey, PA : Information Science Reference, an imprint of IGI Global, 2013), 62, 
doi:10.4018/978-1-4666-4173-0.ch004. 
57 Schmeida and McNeal. “Bridging the Inequality Gap to Accessing Medicare and Medicaid 
Information Online: An Empirical Analysis of E-government Success 2002 through 2010,” 72.  
58 Schmeida and McNeal. “Bridging the Inequality Gap to Accessing Medicare and Medicaid 
Information Online: An Empirical Analysis of E-government Success 2002 through 2010,” 60. 
59 Schmeida and McNeal. “Bridging the Inequality Gap to Accessing Medicare and Medicaid 
Information Online: An Empirical Analysis of E-government Success 2002 through 2010,” 61. 
60 Schmeida and McNeal. “Bridging the Inequality Gap to Accessing Medicare and Medicaid 
Information Online: An Empirical Analysis of E-government Success 2002 through 2010,” 61. 
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Kurtz, Sagamore, and Cole investigated techniques used to increase citizen 
participation in online government services of tax preparation and vehicle registration at 
the state level. They assert that cost effectiveness from e-government services rely on 
increased usage. They address the efficacy of the government’s encouragement of citizens’ 
usage of e-government services based on human behavior and state marketing investments 
made.61 They found that taxpayers’ behavior towards the usage of online services can be 
encouraged with marketing that ensures web service convenience, ease, and safety.62  
Liu’s and Yuan’s case study assessed “Urban Community Grids Management 
(UCGM) effects on local governments across three cities (Beijing, Shanghai and 
Wuhan).63 They found factors that were effective for finding ways to enable the delivery 
of public services and improved communications between government and citizens.64 
According to Shuhua Monica Liu and Qianli Yuan, factors that lead to the success of e-
government amenities fell under two categories: technical and organizational.65 They 
claim that accessibility, quality, and efficient communications across dynamic societal and 
technological boundaries are favorable to the electronic environment.66 The success of e-
government is contingent on the quality of leadership, management, and process 
modification around the needs of citizens, which build the value users are looking for.67  
                                                 
61 Jennifer A. Kurtz, Roland J. Cole, and Isabel A. Cole, Politics, Democracy and E-Government: 
Participation and Service Delivery (Hershey PA : Information Science Reference, 2010), chap. 2, 
https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-61520-933-0.ch002. 
62 Kurtz, Cole and Cole, Politics, Democracy and E-Government: Participation and Service Delivery, 
34.  
63 Shuhua M. Liu, and Qianli Yuan. “Urban Community Grids Management in Metropolitan China: A 
Case Study on Factors Contributing to Mobile Governance Success.” In E-Government Success around the 
World: Cases, Empirical Studies, and Practical Recommendations, ed. J. Ramon Gil-Garcia, 145, 
(Hershey, PA : Information Science Reference, 2013), https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-4666-4173-0.ch008 
64 Liu and Yuan. “Urban Community Grids Management in Metropolitan China: A Case Study on 
Factors Contributing to Mobile Governance Success,” 149.  
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Trust is a powerful factor that significantly affects e-government implementation. 
According to Gabriel Puron-Cid, “trust is one of the most influential factors for e-
government success.”68 He adds “the literature points out different types of trust related to 
e-government adoption: trust of internet, trust of government, perceived usefulness of 
technology, perceived quality of e-government services, and disposition to trust.”69 These 
types of trust help form the dimensions from which to observe the interaction between 
citizens and government.70 
Once online public services are implemented and available for citizens’ use, they 
must be measured for quality to ensure follow-on sustainment and improvement. 
Measuring e-readiness is significant for the evaluation of the effectiveness of e-government 
implementation, in the assessment of citizen interactions with online services, and for the 
management of  digital ecosystems.  
Lei Zheng writes about e-readiness assessment practices, focusing on the features, 
issues, and problems from a local city’s perspective.71 In this effort, Zheng designs a 
bottom up approach for prescribing a customizable blueprint for assessing different phases 
of e-government development and readiness of cities, countries or government agencies.72 
Zheng’s approach analyzes the political, regulatory, organizational, cultural, 
communication, and technological factors in a government’s ability to use Internet and 
communications technology (ICT) for growing as economy and promoting the public’s 
                                                 
68 Gabriel Puron-Cid, “Trust Measures for Implementers of E-Government Adoption: A Confirmatory 
Factor Analysis.” In E-Government Success around the World: Cases, Empirical Studies, and Practical 
Recommendations, ed. J. Ramon Gil-Garcia, (Hershey, PA : Information Science Reference, an imprint of 
IGI Global, 2013), 79–104, https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-4666-4173-0.ch005 
69 Puron-Cid, Gabriel. “Trust Measures for Implementers of E-Government Adoption: A 
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70 Puron-Cid, Gabriel. “Trust Measures for Implementers of E-Government Adoption: A 
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Government Success around the World: Cases, Empirical Studies, and Practical Recommendations, ed. J. 
Ramon Gil-Garcia (Hershey, PA : Information Science Reference, an imprint of IGI Glob, 2013) 133, 
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well-being.73 Furthermore, according to Zheng, “e-readiness assessment can be an 
effective tool to carry out planning, monitoring and evaluation of the initiatives toward 
Information Society in general and e-Government in particular,” which help promote smart 
city governance.74 
4. Big Data 
Big data publications highlight the mixture of technology and public services 
resulting in the massive accumulation of data. Marie Lowman emphasizes that big data can 
be used as a significant driver for change in methods of collection, management, and 
analysis of information.75  
In recent years there has been growing interest in the volume, velocity, and variety 
(3Vs) dimensions of big data management. Doug Laney draws our attention to how 3Vs in 
an information age are pertinent to a common understanding in the public-private 
collaboration and management of growing complex data.76  
Ossi Ylijokil and Jari Porras traced the evolution of the big data definition.77 They 
conclude that there are currently 17 different definitions of big data. They assert that many 
of the definitions are inconsistent because technical and usage aspects are mixed and, 
additionally, that current definitions are limited in accounting for security and privacy 
attributes.78  
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In 2019, an executive survey was conducted about how big data is being used in 
business transformation.79 Surprisingly, 95 percent of business executives point to cultural 
and organizational barriers, instead of technical problems, as reasons preventing the full 
adoption of big data in companies.80  
Song et al. in their research concluded that big data analysis is the key for 
innovation and allow citizens to act on new insights to help reformat city infrastructure and 
change how people behave in order to achieve a smarter world.81  
Micael Stonebraker argues in a panel discussion forum conducted by 
Communications of the ACM that predictive models and big data analysis algorithms are 
built by humans with a variety of biases, a situation which can create a world of deception 
if not carefully improved and managed over time.82  
Some experts, like Patrick Park, argue that big data analytics fail most of the time 
because industry perceives the indiscriminate massive collection and analysis of data is 
good in general without tying it to specific objectives and meaningful results.83 
Furthermore, he asserts that the success of big data analysis relies on a combination of 
humanities and engineering to create human value and should be the priority.84  
Won Kim, Ok-Ran Jeong, and Chulyun Kim assert that the human element is 
overlooked when it comes to big data analysis which is needed in determining the meaning 
                                                 
79 Thomas H. Davenport and Randy Bean, “Big Data and AI Executive Survey 2019,” New Vantage 
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behind the data, prioritizing what data should be analyzed, and in conducting big data 
analysis process.85 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The aim of this research is to discover solutions to challenges linked to smart cities 
influence over the transformation of homeland security and public service delivery to 
citizens. This thesis first examines the overarching privacy and security challenges to 
homeland security derived from the implementation of smart city strategies.  
I will qualitatively analyze information related to those challenges using a 
comparative case study approach to highlight differences and similarities on how those 
challenges are managed between countries that are in the process of putting smart city 
strategies into practice.  
The two case studies chosen are Singapore and Denmark, because of their unique 
governmental configurations and differing attitudes towards the notion of privacy and 
security. Moreover, both are considered advanced and innovative countries that have taken 
different paths toward the implementation of smart city concepts, and both states share 
similar issues.  
This thesis will not explore the theory behind how specific types of technologies 
function. Instead it will highlight the effectiveness of policies, public-private 
organizations’ roles, and practices that may help fill gaps within the United States 
homeland security terrain influenced by the adoption of technology within urban 
communities. 
E. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The thesis will be separated into five chapters. Chapter I will annotate the problem, 
and present the thesis question, significance of the question, and the literature review. The 
                                                 
85 Won Kim, Ok-Ran Jeong and Chulyun Kim. “A Holistic View of Big Data,” In Big Data: 
Concepts, Methodologies, Tools, and Applications, ed. Information Resources Management Association 
(Hershey, Pennsylvania : Information Science Reference, 2016), https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-4666-9840-
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literature review will outline publications related to smart security, big data, e-government, 
and smart standards. This Chapter will conclude with my research design and thesis outline.  
Chapter II will shine a spotlight on challenges facing homeland security’s ability to 
adapt and apply adequate protective measures to digital communities. The factors 
contributing to these challenges include, public-private information sharing, information-
communications technology standardization, management of big data, and privacy. 
Chapter III will compare U.S. and foreign smart city cases to reveal strengths, 
weaknesses and various approaches to the governance over citizens and online government 
societies. 
Chapter IV will provide the results from the information provided in the 
comparative case studies and analysis discussed in Chapter III. 
Chapter V will provide a synopsis and recommendations of the research conducted 
with regards to homeland security’s environmental challenges and opportunities being 
created for the community’s usage of online government services.  
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II. CHALLENGES FOR HOMELAND SECURITY’S 
ADJUSTMENT TO A SMART CITY ECOSYSTEM 
People are migrating from rural areas to cities, placing great stress on aging 
infrastructure and resources in cities around the world. In response, many countries are 
relying more on technology to manage limited resources while delivering government 
services and security to citizens.  
This changes the way society interact within smart cities, how smart cities govern, 
and how personal information is used among communities, businesses, and government. 
Significant questions are being raised about the significant challenges with the integration 
of technology in cities which are changing the landscape of homeland security. 
Specifically, how should vast amounts of personal data be managed? What measures are 
needed to facilitate information sharing practices between government and private agencies 
in order to maintain citizens’ privacy within a digital environment?  
Chapter II calls attention to the leading challenges that delay cities from 
maximizing the full potential of a smart city ecosystem. Challenges are associated with big 
data management, information sharing in the public-private sector, privacy, and 
standardization. Additionally, this chapter attempts to illustrate related policy choices that 
have done more harm than good in the overall functioning of smart cities. This chapter also 
indicates a lack of coordination and citizen stakeholder involvement as underlying 
contributing factors to an incoherent smart city strategy.  
A. BIG DATA MANAGEMENT 
Big Data is known as big amounts of information accumulated as a result of 
society’s interaction with smart cities information technology (IT) services.86 Big data’s 
value is maximized when a protected process includes both effective management and 
analysis principles.87 
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Today, big data analytics (BDA) allow for online information to be used to interpret 
people’s behavior in the interest of identifying individuals and increasing the public’s 
awareness of what precautions to take.88 Businesses are able to gain immediate feedback 
on customer satisfaction to help forecast economic market changes.89 Law enforcement 
conducts intelligent-policing with the usage of Close Circuit Television (CCTV), facial 
recognition software, cameras and GPS to reduce overall crime in urban areas.90 Moreover, 
big data analytics is helping save lives in the healthcare industry. big data Analytics makes 
possible the 24-hr monitoring of babies in hospitals and the ability for healthcare 
professionals to respond to life-threatening conditions in real time.91 However, there are 
issues that need to be addressed.  
Big data has introduced a set of challenges related to the complex characteristics of 
data. Big data varies significantly between users and requires dynamic ways for it to be 
safeguarded by public-private organizations.92 In the absence of big data management and 
infrastructure to support it; public-private organizations may be victimized by cyber 
intrusions. For example, in 2015, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) was 
hacked, and millions of personal records and information stolen.93 In a separate incident 
in 2015, healthcare company Anthem Inc. was hacked, leading to stolen patient medical 
ID numbers, income and contact information.94  
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B. PUBLIC-PRIVATE INFORMATION SHARING 
The value of big data in an information age has precipitated the exponential 
production, and sharing of information facilitated by technology’s role in smart societies. 
It is critical for smart cities to aide in the collaboration among stakeholders, owners, and 
operators in the forming of security measures around complex network environments.95 
Elaborate information and interdependencies of networks, societies, and agencies are 
confronted by pervasive threats to national security. Security agencies depend heavily on 
the information sharing practices in collaboration with federal, state, local and tribal 
entities.96  
Smart ecosystems allow criminals to conveniently leverage online resources to 
inflict severe and costly damages on citizens. In order to respond effectively to these types 
of threats, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 
which led to the establishment of 77 Fusion Centers.97  
The purpose of fusion centers is to enable federal intelligence experts to relay 
classified information to law enforcement, emergency responders and critical infrastructure 
operators.98 Fusion centers are meant to be a conduit for information sharing to flow both 
ways between public-private organizations.  
There are significant problems impeding information sharing mechanisms.99 Brian 
Jenkins, Andrew Liepman, and Henry Willis describe challenges that inhibit the sharing of 
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information domestically between the FBI and law enforcement agencies.100 Part of the 
problem is that the intelligence community (IC) currently operates without a unified 
approach towards intelligence operations.101 Second, the FBI’s role is directed towards the 
prevention of “high end” attacks and lacked the capacity in dealing effectively with cyber 
intrusions or detecting homegrown terrorists.102 Third, information that is collected and 
combined by Fusion Centers is not shared laterally between other operation centers or 
police departments around the country.103 The inability of security and law enforcement 
agencies in the sharing of information effectively and in a new digital age will hamper the 
progress needed in an evolving homeland security landscape.  
Adding to the debate of information sharing practices, civil liberties pose concerns 
of the limits that exist in regards to collecting domestic information with the objective of 
ensuring a smart and secure urban environment.104 According to the Constitution Project, 
violations to freedom of speech are likely to occur without proper regulations or oversight 
of law enforcement agencies.105 At the same time, citizens’ trust erodes when civil liberties 
are unprotected. Trust is vital because it affects security agencies reliance on society’s 
assistance in counterterrorism or law enforcement intelligence operations.106   
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The Code of Federal Regulation #28, Part 23 forbids law enforcement agencies that 
are funded by the government from “collecting or maintaining personal information about 
individuals in criminal databases,”107 except if there is “reasonable suspicion” that a 
person is part of some sort of criminal activity.108 The determination of “reasonable 
suspicion” by law enforcement is based on a subjective decision which can be 
indiscriminately applied.109 In 2012, the Constitution Project reported that 
counterterrorism trainers taught personnel at Fusion Centers to monitor the phones of 
Muslim academic groups and mosques to stop the infiltration of Sharia Law in the United 
States.110  
Furthermore, fusion centers are able to access federal and state record databases, to 
gain personal data that includes drivers’ licenses, insurance, credit reports, and phone 
numbers from illegitimate information brokers.111 Fusion center experts use personal data 
to solve crime cases, but without addressing the potential intelligence gaps, this may lead 
to mistakes and result in falsely accusing certain individuals.112  
In an effort to bridge the gap in information sharing between federal, law 
enforcement and the private sector; fusion centers are embedding private sector 
representatives within their facilities with access to personal information but without the 
proper clearances.113 Nevertheless, there are minimal restraints for private companies from 
sharing customer information with fusion center databases or verifying their compliance 
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with legal requirements in the handling of personal information.114 Fusion centers are a 
significant component in the homeland security terrain that provide an essential conduit for 
public-private collaboration and for ensuring a secure digital environment. Smart 
ecosystems and civil liberties may be inadequately protected if fusion center dysfunctions 
in information sharing activities go uncorrected. 
C. PRIVACY 
Personal privacy of smart city residents is at risk of being jeopardized by the 
extensiveness of big data and the government’s reliance on the sharing of personal 
information. The fourth amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects a citizen’s right to 
privacy and affords them the option of keeping personal information from the public in 
order to remain anonymous.115 However, in 2015, President Trump overturned a privacy 
rule that was enforced by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), which no 
longer prevents internet service providers from sharing customer’s online data with other 
companies.116 Internet Service Providers (ISPs) supply online services to customers while 
concealing their ability of free access to their customers’ online activity. Knowing how 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) are using customer information from wireless services is 
important because it can be used to track a customers’ location or, if mishandled, can lead 
to personal vulnerabilities for online consumers.117  
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) perceives smart cities as 
“surveillance cities,” because the technology embedded within cities is viewed as a way of 
surveilling poor and colored parts of digital communities disproportionately.118 For 
instance, Oakland California, a sanctuary city, collected license plate information routinely 
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on its residents and transferred it from the transportation department.119 The transportation 
department then passed the license plate information to regional intelligence fusion centers 
and the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency to help track down 
undocumented immigrants.120  
Additionally, citizens are nervous because of cities like San Diego have started to 
install smart street light systems called the “ShotSpotter network.”121 ShotSpotter 
networks contain LEDs and sensors that are able to recognize gunfire and alert the police 
in real time.122 The concern of city residents is that the local government of San Diego 
will place them in locations based on law enforcement’s personal biases such as high crime 
areas and poor, and colored city neighborhoods.123  
Striking a balance between personal privacy and a smart city’s incorporation of 
technology in the delivery of public services will require citizens to participate in city 
government so they can communicate their concerns to city managers on decisions 
pertaining to a smart city’s effects on personal privacy. 
D. STANDARDIZATION 
Standardization in smart city development is critical to the design of information 
technology (IT), policy, and public-private organizations in the development of a smart 
city framework. Standards create a common perception and expectations of people, 
systems, or services.124 Lawrence Busch asserts that society views previously formulated 
rules or systems to define what we deem as a model for the qualities of ethics and safety.125 
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He claims that standards can be “measured, tested, examined and revised.”126 
Standardizing the concept of time during the U.S. industrial revolution in the 19th century 
allowed railroads to move materials and labor forces across the country on time, which 
brought economic prosperity to a significant portion of society.127 A public-private 
agreement on the standards in the design of clocks and the interpretation of time in relation 
to a public train transport system created a reliable and valuable service to communities 
worldwide.  
City planners, engineers and leaders have formed working groups over the last ten 
years in an attempt to address significant standardization concerns relevant to smart city 
development. The public-private consensus is that standardization is needed in the 
development of intelligent city architecture.128 Smart city standardization can promote the 
efficiency of equipment, safety and public services under an umbrella of protection for 
people with minimal interoperable barriers.129 
Standards can lead to efficient use of resources.130 According to the National 
Institute and Standards Technology “sound interoperability standards will ensure that 
public and private sector technology investments are not wasted. Such standards enable 
diverse systems and their components to work together and to securely exchange 
meaningful information.”131 Furthermore, the institute envisions “large, integrated and 
complex systems [that] require different layers of interoperability.”132  
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III. CASE STUDIES: SINGAPORE AND DENMARK 
This chapter compares the impacts of smart city concepts in connection to the 
delivery of public services, privacy and national security to the citizens of Singapore and 
Denmark. The expansion of national security measures in response to digital city 
operations are affecting the privacy of citizens in Singapore and Denmark. Comparing the 
methods in the implementation of smart city strategies in each country may reveal the 
elements that impact privacy and security of citizens. 
The Singapore and Denmark are “developed countries” with advanced economies 
and infrastructure.133 In terms of human development,134 the populations of all three 
countries lead the world in the level of education completed by an average person, have a 
higher than average standard of living and live longer and healthier lives.135 Moreover, all 
three countries are notable for demonstrating their innovative ability in the development of 
technological solutions for solving major societal problems. According to the 2018 Global 
Innovation Index, all three countries are in the top ten for creating an innovative 
environment through policies, institutions, and expertise who are capable of achieving 
greater economic output than most other countries.136 However, this is where most 
similarities pertinent to this chapter end. Each country is unique in the way public services 
and security are provided via smart city strategies to improve the well-being of their society 
and how privacy is considered in related matters.  
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A. CASE STUDY: SINGAPORE 
1. History and Origins of Singapore’s Smart City Strategy 
The beginnings of Singapore’s smart city strategy were driven by its government’s 
ability to overcome significant challenges stemming from its geography, limited living 
space and newfound independence.137 These challenges increased unemployment, 
housing, water, and infrastructure problems.138 Its struggles with these challenges are 
important for understanding the environmental and political dimensions that have sparked 
a nationally unified effort towards the usage of technology and expertise in accelerating its 
development. 
Singapore’s independence and political dynamics were shaped by its history with 
adversity caused by Japanese aggression during WWII, British colonialism in the early 20th 
century, and constant internal ethnic-group struggles.139 In 1965, Singapore claimed its 
independence from Malaysia to become the Republic of Singapore.140 Singapore’s 
newfound independence set the stage for its political People’s Action Party (PAP) to 
emerge and take control of its unicameral-parliament system for decades to come.141  
Some claim that Singapore’s government is democratic yet governs itself more like 
an autocracy. This outside perspective may have been originally shaped by Singapore’s 
first Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and his draconian use of power.142 In 2015, former 
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew died but his principles of what have been described as 
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pragmatic and authoritarian, still remain.143 According to Carlton Tan, the People Action 
Party’s (PAP) continue to apply Yew’s principles in the manner of what Tan calls 
“calculated coercion” in order to keep the population happy for the purpose of maintaining 
its autocratic rule over Singapore.144  
Additionally, Joshua Kurlantzick points out that the People’s Action Party’s (PAP) 
success in maintaining state control can be attributed to a few significant factors.145 First, 
the People’s Action Party’s (PAP) makes slight adjustments in response to the public’s 
sentiment that helps maintain its advantage over any type of political opposition.146 
Second, Kurlantzick states that the People’s Action Party’s (PAP) has instituted significant 
gerrymandering imposed against its political opposition.147 And third, the People’s Action 
Party’s (PAP) has full control over resources and significant influence over the media in 
Singapore and leverage them in support of maintaining governmental control.148   
Even though the political dynamics at play in Singapore were complicated at the 
time, its government was unified in its efforts towards aggressively advancing Singapore’s 
overall national development. The People’s Action Party (PAP) initially worked in solving 
its problems by leveraging its air transport, major shipbuilding, and oil refining industries 
in sustaining its economic growth from the 1970s through the 1990s.149 Eventually 
Singapore moved its “labor intensive industries”150 to other countries that were a part of 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and “replaced them with high-
technology production and a service-based economy.”151  
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Singapore’s government realized that future developmental planning would need 
to involve public-private stakeholders if it wanted to maintain its “political independence 
and economic” growth while concurrently mending its social-culturally fractured 
society.152 To that end, Singapore’s Ministry of National Development (MND) partnered 
with the State and City Planning (SCP) group to bring public and private key personnel 
together for the purpose of forming the “1971 Concept Plan.”153 The aim of the Concept 
Plan was to expand “Singapore’s economic base, reduce unemployment, slow down the 
rate of population growth, and improve [its] standard of living.”154  
Unlike the United States, Singapore used a government led approach and a thirty-
year outlook in their planning process that incorporated urban, social, and economic 
development policies.155 Additionally, Singapore’s parliament formed several smart city 
agencies and enlisted the help of private and educational experts from the beginning for 
the collaboration of smart city implementation. 
2. Singapore Smart Infrastructure and Public Service Delivery 
Singapore smart city plans evolved through multiple phases that focused initially 
on building the information technology and telecommunication architecture needed to 
achieve its objectives. Singapore’s smart city and infrastructure was designed in six master-
plans derived from its 1971 concept plan. The smart city master-plans were implemented 
in two phases.156 The first phase took place from 1980 to 1992 which formed “The 
National Computerization Plan (NCP), National IT Plan (NITP), and IT2000”157 together 
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formed a three step approach for advancing it’s national information communications 
infrastructure.158 The first step was to computerize Singapore’s governmental departments 
and the delivery of its public services.159 The second step emphasized the use of 
technology in the exchanging of data between government, businesses, and the public.160 
The third step involved the installation of national information technology (IT) 
infrastructure linking all “homes, office buildings, schools, and factories.” 161 
The next phase of Singapore’s smart city design centered on the delivery of 
government services using information technology. This phase of initiatives consisted of 
the Infocomm21, Connected Singapore, and iN2015 plans which were implemented from 
2000 to 2006.162 Once Singapore had the basic information technology and 
telecommunications infrastructure in place, it was able to provide electronic government 
(e-government) services to the public.163 In addition, broadband capacity across Singapore 
was expanded to support the pervasiveness of “wireless,” “wired networks,” and “mobile 
services.”164 Furthermore, the iN2015 plan sought to spread ultra-high speed and wireless 
broadband networks throughout Singapore to establish an “e-society,” “e-economy,” and 
to enable Singapore to become a global information-communications capital.165 
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Singapore’s information-technology (IT) infrastructure and its vision for public 
service delivery166 constructed a robust electronic-Government (e-government) service 
platform for its citizens.167 Singapore’s level of smart city preparedness in the offering of 
e-government services was driven by the aspects of access, information-communications 
infrastructure capacity, and in the arrangement of online services. 
Improving the access, quality and efficiency of Singapore’s new smart city platform 
were areas that helped encouraged the usage of public services provided to citizens. 
Singapore’s smart infrastructure platform affords the majority of its citizens access to fast 
and efficient online information and the services necessary to communicate with its 
government, businesses, and communities.168 In 2016, Freedom House reported that “91 
percent”169 of Singaporean families have access to broadband internet services.170 
Furthermore, “95 percent of homes and businesses”171 have access to a “fiber-based Next 
Generation Broadband Network (Next Gen NBN).”172 Singapore also offers free national 
“Wireless@SG” access at over “3,900 hotspots” to the public.173  
The high quality and extensive public access to online government services 
encourages citizens to use its internet platform increasing the readiness and return on 
investment made towards smart city infrastructure. Furthermore, according to Toshio Obi 
and Naoko Iwasaki, Singapore ranked #1 in 2015 in World e-Government preparedness.174 
The evaluation of e-Government preparedness was measured in part by the deployment of 
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information-communications technology (ICT) infrastructure, “operations, management 
optimization, online services and the relationship between governments and their 
stakeholders.”175  
Singapore’s eCitizen Portal is “a single access point to all government information 
and services on the internet”176 and allows several government agencies to utilize the same 
resources in providing over 1,600 online services to its citizens.177 The online services are 
known as “eTowns” and are grouped together into separate access points for its citizens, 
businesses, and government entities.178 Part of the eTown services include healthcare, 
housing, transportation, education, security, and community development.179  
3. Privacy Versus Checks and Balances in Singapore 
Maintaining the privacy of online users in smart communities is becoming more 
difficult due to the lack of rules, oversight, and awareness in how personal information is 
managed in the virtual public sphere. The personal data collected in citizens interactions 
with e-government services has significant value for public and private organizations. 
Personal data in this context means “information relating to an identified or identifiable 
individual (data subject).”180 Individuals’ information is created or available in the form 
of online searches, photos, videos, social data, geo-location or identifiable information 
(police, health, financial…etc.).181  
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Singaporeans have concerns about how their data is handled and used in relation to 
their privacy, but those concerns lack the level of enthusiasm needed to dissuade 
complacent online behavior. According to a 2016 KPMG privacy survey, 56 percent of 
Singaporeans “are either concerned or extremely concerned” when it comes to the “level 
of trust in [how] organizations [handle] their personal data.”182 Less than 55 percent 
actively “manage their social media privacy settings.”183 Less than 45 percent “regularly 
change username and passwords.”184 And less than 35 percent “examine privacy policies 
and cookie notifications.”185 This shows a significant contradiction when it comes to 
personal data concerns and complacency issues of Singaporean’s usage of high-tech 
services. Such contradictions raise questions about what governments can do to improve 
awareness and education to mitigate complacency and safeguarding methods of personal 
data that the public can use.  
Privacy is taken into consideration in Singapore’s smart city strategy but is not a 
main priority. Unlike America’s constitution, “Singapore’s constitution does not contain 
any explicit right to privacy.”186 Nevertheless, the Parliament of Singapore has put a series 
of key regulations in place on how private organizations manage personal data and citizens’ 
privacy. The Personal Data Protection Act of 2012 (PDPA), Computer Misuse and 
Cybersecurity Act (CMCA) and the Cybersecurity Act established a “national cyber 
framework”187 for protecting critical information infrastructure and citizens’ personal data 
against threats and potential private sector mishandlings of personal data.188 
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Although Singapore’s government makes an effort in defending its citizens’ 
privacy against the private sector, it does very little in restraining itself from accessing and 
using its citizens’ personal data. This is because Singapore’s parliament is exempted from 
major portions of its policies, like the Personal Data Protection Act.189 This allows 
Singapore’s government to force internet service providers to hand over personal data of 
their users190 and in blocking certain public websites.191 For example, “in 2013, Citizen 
Lab of the University of Toronto” discovered the Singapore government utilizes Bluecoat 
software, which has the capability to conduct surveillance of public applications like: 
Google, Twitter and Skype.192 Singapore’s police have the authority to “intercept online 
messages” and search and seize computers without a warrant in search of documents 
related to crimes involving online transactions.193 Such exemptions give Singapore’s 
government broad powers to exercise strict online censorship and control over the 
expression of its citizens when it comes to politics and religion.194 
The security measures used by Singapore policymakers raises questions about the 
effectiveness of its checks and balance system. Singapore’s constitution originated from 
the “Westminister model”195 which includes a separation of powers system within three 
branches of government: the executive, legislative and judiciary.196 However, over time 
Singapore’s People’s Action Party (PAP) have worked together in overriding power 
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checking methods leading to its new label as a “dictatorial political system”197 by 
overshadowing and silencing their political rivals.198  
The separation of powers was unable to restrain Singapore’s government leaders 
because of their successful efforts in thwarting fair elections, freedom of expression, and 
stacking the political deck in favor of the People’s Action Party (PAP) in the wake of 
national economic success.199 Singapore’s parliament has passed laws like the Sedition 
Act, to prevent online criticism.200 In a similar manner it passed the Newspaper and 
Printing Presses Act and the Broadcasting Act, which permitted greater flexibilities in the 
licensing and regulation of the internet activities and organizations.201 Some argue that 
despite Singapore’s government abuses of power, it maintains control over the nation by 
distracting its public with economic prosperity through “authoritarian capitalism.”202   
4. Security  
The privacy and personal information of citizens in smart communities are related 
and impact the level of trust needed for smart city sustainment. Singapore’s smart 
infrastructure, public services, and accumulation of data impacts how security and personal 
data protection is provided to its citizens. Singapore’s e-government platform and services 
generate tons of personal data that has to be protected and properly managed. When 
personal data is not adequately safeguarded, vulnerabilities emerge through the publicity 
of cyber-attacks making the safety of smart city services questionable.  
Hacker and cyber criminals are taking advantage of the vulnerabilities within global 
information technology domains with sophisticated types of cyber-attacks. Spear Phishing, 
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Distributed Denial of Service (DDos), and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) are types 
of trending cyber-attacks in the search for private data that are launched against individuals, 
companies, and government agencies.203 According to Stephen Morgan, data breaches 
across the world will cost “$2.1 trillion” by [the end of] 2019.”204 The consequences of 
widespread cyber-attacks and vulnerabilities in all facets of societies worldwide have 
become too expensive to ignore.  
Singapore has taken the initiative in confronting these types of pervasive cyber 
threats and related vulnerabilities. Singapore has instituted security applications and 
initiatives when it comes to the handling of personal information and public safety in 
cities.205 In support of protecting individuals, Singapore has created smart city applications 
for its citizens to use when accessing online health, banking and other public services.206 
For instance, the National Digital Identity application allots users a single digital identity 
token for domestic or international transactions with any Singapore government agency for 
online public services.207 This has reduced the risk of fraud and improved personal and 
network security for Singapore’s city population. 
Singapore is one of the best countries in preparedness when defending against 
digital theft in a growing smart city era. According to the Economist’s Safe Cities Index 
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2017 report, Singapore ranked second in terms of digital security and first in personal and 
infrastructure security.208  
Singapore is empowering its civil servants with training in cyber threats and 
weaknesses. The introduction of a mandatory cyber security training course is currently 
provided by Singapore’s Smart Nation and Digital Government Office for its public service 
employees.209 In 2019, the training program encompassed “145,000 officers” across “16 
ministries and over 60 statutory boards.”210   
The monitoring of Singapore’s localities has significantly ramped up to help assist 
Singapore’s police force in the reducing of crime. Singapore’s law enforcement agencies 
have deployed the police camera installation initiative, Polcam 2.0 which was responsible 
for the installation of over “5,000” cameras within its smart city public areas which 
included homes, carparks, transport stations, and downtown areas.211 According to Yi, the 
PolCam system has aided in solving over “2,300” crimes.212  
The degree of safety within smart cities is important, but no city, even Singapore, 
can be completely protected all the time from every potential threat. For instance, in 2018 
Singapore’s online health network, “SingHealth,” was successfully hacked resulting in the 
compromise of “1.5 million patient records,” including the record of Singapore’s Prime 
Minister Lee Hsien Loong.213 The SingHealth investigation revealed that employees who 
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handled health records had a lack of understanding of what a cyber security incident was 
or what the reporting process was once a cyber-attack was discovered.214 This theme is 
consistent with a Singapore online public awareness survey in 2019 that showed that 
Singaporeans were complacent with online activity and lacked concern for cyber 
threats.215  
B. CASE STUDY: DENMARK 
This portion of the chapter uses Denmark in comparison to the United States and 
Singapore to examine the similarities and differences of governmental priorities that 
influenced how they executed their smart city strategies. Denmark, the United States and 
Singapore have similar concerns regarding the impact that smart city strategies have on 
citizens’ privacy and security. Denmark’s geography, constitution and governmental 
construct and its historical path taken towards the adoption of a smart city strategy are 
different from the United States and Singapore. Denmark is considered a shining example 
to the world of how to execute a smart city strategy, making it an appealing case study. 
Denmark’s membership within the European Union and its geography raises unique 
challenges in relation to urban communities’ reliance on public services, energy, and the 
affects felt from climate change that the U.S. and Singapore may not relate to.  
This segment of the chapter starts with a brief description of Denmark’s geography, 
government makeup, key policy goals and main events that led to the origins of Denmark’s 
adoption of a smart city plan. The development of smart infrastructure, public services, and 
personal data is discussed to provide context to how these elements are managed and 
regulated in a smart city framework. Consequently, privacy, security, and the separation of 
powers will be discussed to provide the social and governmental dynamics at play that 
effect how Denmark institutes its smart city plan and how it can be used in the United 
States to avoid the same challenges.  
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1. History and Origins of Denmark’s Smart City Strategy 
In contrast to the United States and Singapore, Denmark is geographically 
connected to Germany and at the same time possesses hundreds of archipelagic islands.216 
Mogens Rüdiger points out that the location of Denmark makes it a place for extremely 
cold winter seasons causing a significant dependency on energy imports from oil producing 
countries as a primary heating source.217 Denmark has a population of over 5 million 
people, with the majority of its populace who are older and ailing, placing increased 
pressure on its healthcare system.218  
In 1849, the organization of Denmark’s government was established; transitioning 
its political system from an absolute monarchy into a constitutional monarchy responsible 
for representing the millions of Danish citizens.219  
Denmark has been a part of many conflicts throughout the history of Europe. 
However, none have been as impactful on its future security and well-being of its people 
as the 1973 Yom Kippur War.220 Denmark suffered from actions taken by the Organization 
of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) in response to the Yom Kippur War 
between Israel and Arab States (Egypt and Syria) by instituting an oil embargo against 
Israel and their western country supporters.221 At the time, Denmark was overly dependent 
on oil imports from oil-producing countries for the heating of homes and transportation.222  
Prior to the crisis, Denmark had not played a key role or established relevant 
policies in how the energy sector functioned.223 Denmark’s Prime Minister Anker 
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Jorgensen and the Danish Parliament kick-started a structural shift in their country’s 
reliance on oil.224 It responded with a national energy policy and regulatory structure that 
encompassed key initiatives predicated on the restriction of complacent behavior towards 
the usage of energy and drive for energy savings.225  
Over time, Denmark’s energy policies have evolved with the rise of technology’s 
role in urban development and city management. During the 1970s, Denmark’s 
environmentally sustainable development policies were focused on “end-of-pipe”226 and 
pollution issues dealing with wastewater, transportation, and energy triggered by the 
aforementioned oil crisis.227 As the usage of technology in cities had increased, Denmark 
turned its attention to “clean technologies and product design approaches between the 
1980s and 1990s.”228 More recently in 2010, when the Smart City concept was introduced 
in Denmark, they shifted their attention towards a Sustainable Smart City Strategy.229 The 
purpose of the strategy was to answer the challenges within its urban communities in “the 
use of data, sensors, and autonomous machines and vehicles” with a “human-centric 
governance framework.”230 Not only is technology helping optimize Denmark’s public 
infrastructure, services, and limited resources but technology is increasing its role in the 
operation and security of Denmark’s cities.  
2. Denmark Smart Infrastructure and Public Service Delivery 
For Denmark’s sustainable smart city strategy to be effective, it needed a robust 
smart infrastructure capable of driving down pollution, increasing energy efficiency, and 
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delivering public services to its citizens. Similar to Singapore, Denmark understood that 
the construction of a smart infrastructure depended on the coordination between public-
private stakeholders working together to find ways for a municipal approach for 
governance, funding, and operations across multiple public domains.231  
For these reasons, in 2013, Denmark formed the “Danish Smart City Network”232 
in support of implementing its Smart City strategy.233 Denmark’s coordination efforts 
were effective in creating a smart infrastructure which consisted of a Danish Basic Data 
platform interconnected with information-communications technology combined with an 
advanced energy smart grid.234 According to the 2018 Global Connectivity Index, 
Denmark ranked 7th for its overall digital infrastructure and its contribution towards the 
transformation of industry, cities, and government.235  
The changes in the lives of Danish citizens have accelerated due to the increased 
availability and access to online public services provided by its digital infrastructure. Like 
Singapore, Denmark’s smart infrastructure platform became the major conduit for 
delivering public services to citizens in Denmark. Denmark uses its smart infrastructure to 
serve the public through the internet domain in the following areas: utilities, transportation, 
healthcare, legal, finances, education and other services.236 Public services are integral to 
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the society of Denmark because of the country’s reputation as a welfare state based in part 
on the premise that its citizens should have the right to healthcare and education.237  
Online public services are also important because Denmark has slowly converted 
to a “mandatory digital self-service and communications” program with the goal of 
adequately managing an ageing and ailing society.238 For example; Denmark’s “eHealth” 
platform allows communications between citizens, healthcare professionals and related 
systems.239 Citizens can receive health consultations, prescriptions, personal health 
information and records via its eHealth platform.240  
The same health information and records are stored in an eHealth database which 
can be accessed and shared between doctors, pharmacies, laboratories, and hospitals.241 
According to the 2018 Euro Health Consumer Index, Denmark’s “Danish Digital Health 
Strategy” 242 is attributed with the country being ranked fourth for the utilization of its 
smart infrastructure in the delivery of health services to its citizens.243  
The access to online public services has impacted the well-being of Danish citizens. 
According to the 2019 World Happiness Report, Denmark ranked second reflecting the 
Danish citizens’ level of well-being in terms of satisfaction towards its government, 
“prosocial behavior,”244 and digital technology’s impact on society with regards to social 
media, personal data, and how they identify with their communities.245  
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3. Privacy and Checks and Balances in Denmark  
The increased usage of online public services by Danish citizens has resulted in the 
massive buildup of personal data that must be protected with technical mechanisms applied 
by organizations in control of personal data.  
Denmark has enacted a set of personal data laws to ensure personal information is 
protected from improper usage. Namely, Denmark passed the Danish Data Protection Act 
of 2018 and has adopted the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation of 
2016.246 Denmark’s “Datatilsynet” (Data Protection Agency) and the European Data 
Protection Board enforce personal data protection laws by regulating how domestic and 
international organizations handle physical and online personal information.247  
At the same time, recent personal data breaches in Denmark leave many Danes 
skeptical of the effectiveness of the Danish Data Protection Agency and policies. For 
instance, it was reported in 2018 that over 40,000 Danish Facebook users had their personal 
information forwarded without consent to Cambridge Analytica for political use in 
Britain’s Brexit bill and the 2016 U.S. election.248  
In 2017, another controversy adding to the skepticism of Denmark’s personal data 
laws emerged when the Danish Ministry of Justice authorized the police to use its 
“nationwide automatic number plate recognition [camera] system (ANPR)”249 for public 
surveillance. It used the system to scan and store the data of “up to 600,000 vehicle 
registration plates a day.”250 Furthermore, the authorization allowed the police to utilize a 
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Global Positioning System (GPS) with ANPR to help recreate the location and route of 
personal vehicles suspected of crimes.251 
Personal data security and online privacy are not the same. Unlike personal data 
security, online privacy goes a step further legally in whether organizations are allowed to 
share personal information with others and how that information is interpreted to other 
parties.252   
Privacy and trust between citizens and government affect how society functions. A 
constitution is a contract between citizens and politicians based on trust that the 
government will defend the people’s rights akin in part to values like online privacy.  
Like the United States, Denmark’s constitution includes the right to privacy and 
has instituted various data-privacy laws for added protection.253 Denmark has committed 
to the United Nation’s “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),”254 
extending the protection of privacy to its citizens to places abroad.255 This shows that the 
Danish government is committed to preserving privacy as a social value domestically and 
internationally.  
Safeguarding and keeping online Personally Identifiable Information (PII) and 
communications private is known as “ePrivacy.”256 Denmark subscribes to the European 
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Parliament’s personal data directive (2016/680)257 That states’ controllers of personal data 
shall design and employ a privacy by default system capable of retaining only the amount 
of personal data necessary for a specific purpose.258 This ensures that Danish organizations 
that manage personal information are in compliance with domestic and international 
personal data privacy laws while conducting business.  
Despite that, Denmark exempts some of its general personal data protections for its 
Ministry of Defense and Intelligence agencies in the matters concerning foreigners and 
anti-terrorism operations.259 The above-mentioned agencies are allowed to collect “raw 
data” domestically on Danish citizens and retain it for up to “15 years.”260 For instance, 
Danish domestic and European Union related airline companies share passenger, name, 
and record information with Denmark’s law enforcement agencies in support of security 
operations.261  
Denmark’s system of checks and balances in relation to the balancing of its security 
measures with civil liberties rests with its constitution.262 Denmark’s intelligence and 
security oversight committees and justice department have the authority to call out 
excessive overreaches in Danish law enforcement operations concerning the surveillance 
and collection of its citizens’ personal data.263 However, Denmark’s adjudication capacity 
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is limited to the associated law in question and is not able to litigate Denmark’s executive 
office’s “discretionary powers” in the application of Danish law.264 
4. Security 
Similar to the United States and Singapore, Denmark has created security policies 
and organizations in support of its smart city ecosystem to protect its public from domestic 
and international threats. Denmark’s security measures of effectiveness depends on a 
variety of elements. In 2011, Denmark’s Agency for Digitization was established under its 
Ministry of Finance with the purpose of administering digital city policies dealing with the 
operations, security, and online services provided to the public.265  
The Danish Centre for Cyber Security (CfCS), the Danish Security and Intelligence 
Service (PET) and Danish Defense Intelligence Service (DDIS) agencies are the 
enforcement agencies for smart city security and policy in Denmark.266 These agencies 
work together in preventing physical and cyber-crime and terrorism, domestically and 
abroad.267  
The Danish Centre for Cyber Security (CfCS) is Denmark’s agency for dealing with 
cyber threats to its information-communications infrastructure by using its civil and 
military Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs).268 The agency has nearly 
unlimited authority stemming from its Centre for Cyber Security Act and from the 
exemptions the agency has from personal data laws to collect and monitor information that 
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passes over public-private digital networks “without [a] court order.”269 The same 
information can be passed to other law enforcement agencies without consent for further 
investigation and even retained for up to “3 years” if needed.270 
Denmark has security policies that cover the physical and cyber domains within 
their smart city framework.271 However, its cyber security policies appear to be 
insufficient when compared to Singapore and the U.S. Denmark’s cyber security policies 
lack a critical infrastructure plan and lacks a public-private partnership agreement, and has 
no mandatory reporting requirement for “cybersecurity incidents” within the private sector 
domain.272 
In 2018, Denmark’s “Cyber and Information Security Strategy” called attention to 
the rise of vulnerabilities in response to the growing digitization of Denmark cities.273 
According to the strategy, the pervasiveness of online networks and their interconnected 
complexities make cyberattacks more easily and cheaply obtainable.274 What’s more, the 
Danish people’s overreliance and lack of “security culture” 275 amplify network 
vulnerabilities.276  
Denmark has established initiatives for the mitigation of cyber vulnerabilities to its 
national security. Some of its key initiatives are causing shifts in Denmark’s national 
security landscape at the public and private echelons of its society. First, several national 
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centers of security experts from public-private spheres are being organized to monitor and 
respond to threats to public online services, infrastructure, and data in real time.277 Second, 
Denmark’s government is educating and raising public awareness of cyber threats along 
with providing online portals for citizens to report online crime.278  
Similarly, Denmark’s government defines what the national technical and 
organizational279 security requirements are and have mandated that public and private 
organizations fulfill them.280 Unlike the United States or Singapore, Denmark puts more 
of the burden for investment and protection standards on the private sector, but provides 
security agencies as an emergency response resource for addressing potential threats. 
Denmark is unique from the United States in that it divides the onus for security investment 
and responsibility between public and private institutions with limited direct funding 
support.281  
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A comparative case study analysis provided in Chapter III between Singapore and 
Denmark found significant affects from smart city infrastructure’s influence on the 
homeland security landscape and its impact on public services and security of citizens. 
There were correlations between the increased usage of smart city services and smart 
technologies and vulnerabilities within urban communities. Vulnerabilities will continue 
to grow as municipalities incorporate more technology in the linking of citizens to 
government services. The significance of security and privacy in Denmark’s and 
Singapore’s approaches to smart city implementation became apparent through the 
research and are outlined below. 
The balance of security and privacy in smart communities depends on the degree 
of collaboration between public-private organizations responsible for smart city 
governance when it comes to design, strategy, policy, investment and education. Finding 
the right balance between security and privacy through effective collaboration in smart city 
design builds trust with online public users.  
Singapore and Denmark started towards smart city design in their efforts for solving 
challenges related to rapid urbanization and limited resources that helped accelerate the 
need for the use of technology. Eventually each government discovered that it could not 
effectively implement a smart city design on their own because of the interests, issues, and 
skills needed from the private and academic communities. Public-private collaboration 
accelerated the innovation and development of the smart city concept used by each country. 
Singapore and Denmark were effective in the implementation of their smart city 
strategies because of their respective governments initially led the collaboration efforts, 
then incrementally shifted part of the smart city developmental role to the private and 
educational sectors. This helped both countries save money by reducing redundant 
resources and increased overall standardization of technology-infrastructure used in their 
smart city designs. Both governments maintained control of the formulation of security 
directives that the public and private sector were mandated to follow.  
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Additionally, a unified effort and long-term outlook in Denmark’s and Singapore’s 
planning process facilitated more efficient  procurement of materials, construction process, 
policy formulation and investment in smart city development.  
Furthermore, effectiveness of the planning process for smart city design depends 
on the inclusion of public-private and key community stakeholders. Stakeholder 
inclusiveness is essential for encouraging the communication of vulnerabilities of smart 
city infrastructure and management details. It stimulates discussion about who is 
responsible for what types of support for security, safety, and management in the usage of 
smart city technology for the delivery of public services.  
Increasing the access of smart city services to all sections of society promotes 
participation in the partaking of public services and helps improve city governance within 
urban communities. Inclusion helps affected citizens by increasing their public awareness, 
education, and promotes the well-being of smart city inhabitants, especially the poor. 
A. PRIVACY 
The U.S., Singapore, and Denmark perceive the issue of privacy differently from a 
societal and legal standpoint. Unlike Singapore and Denmark, the right to privacy in the 
U.S. is embedded in the constitution, creating a legal and social contract that obligates the 
U.S. government in providing adequate protection for personal privacy rights.  
However, the protection of privacy is much more difficult when the complexities 
of technology are involved. Many public-private services provided in a smart environment 
have loopholes when it comes to privacy. Part of the reason is due to the rapid rollout of 
security parameters after major incidents happen without fully considering the design 
features and policies needed for assuring privacy of smart communities. Another reason is 
because privacy takes a backseat when governments levy exemptions for the sake of 
fighting terrorism and crime.  
Another way of looking at privacy concerns in the implementation of smart cities 
is that there are cultural and political differences between countries that affect the way 
privacy is regarded. Some cultures in places like Singapore appear not to value personal 
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privacy the way America does. The Singapore culture in some cases value the common 
good and security of the population more than privacy. Perhaps this can be attributed to the 
traditionally embedded values of discipline and order found within its Confucian culture. 
Singapore’s politics reflect this attitude in the way it prioritizes security policies and 
regulations over privacy protections. This could explain why the Singapore government 
has been able to manage and suppress public dissent over privacy issues by employing 
aggressive surveillance, monitoring, and usage of personal user data. 
B. SECURITY 
The main theme tied to security in smart cities that has emerged deals with cyber 
threats to related networks, online public service platforms, the mishandling of personal 
data, and insufficient training for public service workers. These security-associated threats 
include internal and external state and non-state actors.  
Countries like Singapore and Denmark are deploying smart city technology to help 
in reducing crime while improving the overall well-being of their populations. Effective 
national security transformations in response to an emerging high-tech world in the 
comparative case study analysis of Denmark and Singapore tend to incorporate policies 
and measures that emphasizes public access, awareness, education and consumer rights. 
For example, as described in Chapter III, Denmark implements preventative security 
measures to mitigate abusive usage and access of smart city networks. The preventative 
security measures include a national unique online identification program comparable to a 
digital lock and key model that appreciably improves the protection of its online public 
service forums. 
Another smart city security measure used by Denmark’s government is the Cyber 
Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) Agency concept. The concept consists of teams that 
are made up of cyber-defense, emergency responders, and law enforcement security 
professionals from national, state, and local agencies capable of coordinating and 
responding to threats to government-run information technology platforms. Denmark’s 
CERTs agency concept has helped by decreasing the damages from cyberattacks on 
Denmark’s smart network users. 
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From a law enforcement perspective, the growing usage of surveillance cameras 
and sensors within smart cities helps reduce physical and cybercrime. The ability for law 
enforcement officials at the city level to use cyber, sensors and data on a 24-hour basis in 
monitoring smart populated areas helps improve a real time response to emergency 
situations. Additionally, it helps connect emergency responders to law enforcement, 
security and other agencies to help manage the welfare of citizens and assist affected 
populations under duress.  
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This research sought answers to problems originating in the convergence of smart 
city development and online public service forums with a newly encompassing homeland 
security composition. Overall the qualitative case study examination of smart city 
strategies implemented in Singapore and Denmark concludes that smart technology 
implementation creates both new opportunities and problems for urban communities as 
noted in Chapter I. The reasoning behind smart city implementation is to improve the well-
being of smart urban societies. A shared smart city network that serves the public can help 
save time, money, and resources. Smart city networks can help governments capitalize on 
the usage of personal data to help fulfill various human aspects and interests of diverse 
populations in an increasingly globalized world. Nonetheless, this research highlights the 
inadequacies of smart city design and related operational conventions and raises awareness 
about the introduction of physical, cyber, and organizational weaknesses left to be 
exploited in a smart city environment.  
Chapter II centered on major challenges hindering adequate non-invasive security 
measures in promoting the maximization of benefits that smart cities intend to provide. 
Online personal data is generated at an ever-growing scale that is transforming into big 
data as a consequence of growing human reliance and interactions with online public 
services. Personal data can divulge the identity, behavior, and intent of people’s actions. 
Such information should be shared between federal, state, private, and local law agencies 
involving national security and to prevent greater negative impacts to smart societies as a 
whole. But the security sharing aspect is only half of the equation that requires a 
counterbalancing action of privacy protection in support of the individual. Additionally, 
smart city standardization emerged as a structurally significant underpinning component 
necessary for facilitating the management of big data, sharing of information, privacy 
protection, and for reducing the cumulation of societal risk. 
Chapter III presented a case study comparison between Singapore and Denmark in 
the origins and implementation of smart city strategies. The case study analysis showed 
unique characteristics behind each country’s methods and approaches used in public 
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services delivery and security for the overall well-being of society. Each case study 
demonstrated that smart city planning, policy, interagency coordination, and 
standardization are significant tools that can be leveraged to lessen the risk of unauthorized 
privacy intrusions on citizens while maintaining an effective level of security.  
Chapter IV provided insights that revealed that countries, like the U.S., that are 
working towards smart city development planning are more effective when the process is 
government led, public-private stakeholders are involved, and when there is a long-term 
outlook for implementation. Security and privacy are vital aspects that must be addressed 
during the planning process. Security measures must deal with both intentional and 
unintentional misuses of smart city generated data and technology. Privacy issues in smart 
urban communities emerge because privacy is usually an afterthought in smart city 
development as smart city planners and governments rush the integration of technology 
into cities. Hasty smart city implementation causes governments to be reactive when it 
comes to fixing privacy-related smart city policies and security applications related to 
information sharing. Governments can help alleviate these security and privacy problems 
by controlling network access and raising public awareness about good practices that 
citizens should use in smart city interactions.  
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The U.S. and other country’s taking part in smart city concept implementation have 
made adjustments to policy, planning, and development in an effort to tackle security and 
privacy challenges stemming from online public service delivery. However, this research 
discovered problems with smart city strategy formulation, coordination, privacy and 
security. These problems can be resolved with my following recommendations related to 
collaboration, security, and privacy to help improve smart city policy, strategy, and 
execution. 
1. Collaboration 
As stated in Chapter IV, the level of public-private collaboration is the key to 
finding the right balance between privacy and security in a smart city strategy. 
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Collaboration in smart city implementation can be improved through a top-down smart city 
organizational command and control structure.  
The organizational structure should consist of four echelons. The echelons should 
consist of a congressional oversight committee, U.S. national, regional, and urban smart 
city offices and include the following:  
Congressional smart city oversight committee made up of leaders in congress. They 
would review and implement policy recommendations from smart city stakeholders and 
lower organizational echelons about related management problems and solutions that 
should be addressed. 
U.S. national smart city office that includes experts from Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), Department of Energy (DOE), American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), 
U.S. Office of Science and Technology (OST), smart city projects representatives (mixture 
between academia and private industry representatives).  
U.S. regional smart city offices (i.e., West, East, North, South) that include 
professionals from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), intelligence-fusion 
centers, State law enforcement, American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Department of 
Energy (DOE) and smart city project representatives. 
U.S. urban smart city offices should be added within participating smart city 
communities. Urban smart city offices should include the involvement of the mayor, 
emergency services, law enforcement, local public utilities (energy and communications), 
private industry leaders, and community organizers.  
Each echelon should hold meetings and hearings periodically to address the related 
condition, implementation, lessons learned, and concerns that emerge from smart city 
implementation. The smart city organization structure should be flexible in authority and 
in decision making processes. The organizational structure should be decentralized in 
decision making when it comes to responding to related smart city physical and cyber 
emergencies. The smart city organizational structure would be more centralized in decision 
making in terms of planning, policy formulation, design and implementation. Additionally, 
expert involvement and collaboration at all organizational echelons for smart city 
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governance brings valuable insights to smart city infrastructure, security and privacy in the 
online public services used by smart urban populations.  
2. Security 
From a security standpoint, I recommend the U.S. use a two-pronged approach. 
First, the U.S. should use Denmark’s model described in Chapter III and IV for responding 
to cyber threats in the form of a Cyber Emergency Response Team (CERT) agency concept 
be replicated and modified slightly. The U.S. should expand the CERT model with an 
added physical security component, resulting in a U.S. Physical-Cyber Emergency 
Response Team (P-CERT).  
This security component should be implemented at the U.S. regional and local 
urban smart city organizational echelons. P-CERT professionals would be provided initial 
and follow-on periodic training. They would work together with regional Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) fusion centers by employing intelligence gathered under 
reasonable suspicion to help thwart physical or cyber threats within smart cities.  
This security approach can help improve real-time responses to criminal, 
emergency, and terrorist type activity within smart cities. Moreover, it bridges the security 
gap between the cyber and physical domains where the eventuality of automated 
technology is expected to operate and manage public services, infrastructure, human, and 
machine interactions with smart city functions.  
Additionally, the U.S should replicate Denmark’s digital identification initiative. 
The security initiative is a government “Easy ID”282 program that enables its citizens to 
use a national digital signature to access online public services globally and through a 
government portal that spans across multiple agencies.283  
                                                 
282 The European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Danish National Cyber Security Strategy, 25.  
283 The European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Danish National Cyber Security Strategy, 32.  
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3. Privacy 
I recommend the following for the privacy of smart city citizens. First, the U.S. 
government should provide and control a main smart city network (physical and cyber) in 
cities that desire to adopt a smart city concept.  
The smart city network should only be accessed by people with a nationally 
approved form of digital identification.284 A government-provided online public service 
portal would allow security agencies to monitor online activity occurring within the portal.  
Public-private organizations that desire to offer public services to citizens must 
utilize the portal. These organizations would be responsible for safeguarding private 
personal information generated through public service interactions. However, they would 
also be responsible for utilizing government-approved security software, programs, and 
hardware that help them detect cyber or physical violations. It would also be mandatory 
for these companies to report such violations to their customers and to local and regional 
Physical-Cyber Emergency Response Team (P-CERT) representatives.  
Additionally, the meaning of personal privacy is changing in response to smart city 
developments taking place around the world. There are limitations to the protection of 
personal privacy when it comes to government-provided services or infrastructure. U.S. 
Security and law enforcement agencies can legally conduct reasonable searches if they 
suspect criminal or threatening activities that may occur within smart city physical and 
cyber domains.  
As for smart city societies, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), 
community organizers, city councils, and city residents must be involved with the planning, 
implementation, and ongoing usage of smart city technologies. For instance, the ACLU 
has found a way to protect smart city residents by collaborating with local city governments 
and law enforcement agencies through the establishment of Community Control Over 
                                                 
284 The European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Danish National Cyber Security Strategy, 25. 
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Police Surveillance (CCOPS) laws in 2016.285 The CCOPS approach helps residents in 
working with their respective city councils “to decide if and how surveillance technologies 
are used, through a process that maximizes the public’s influence over those decisions.”286 
Furthermore, CCOPS “include a transparent approval process that requires public 
disclosure, open hearings, and sign-off from elected officials on all surveillance 
technologies and the specific ways in which they intend to use them.”287 
4. Further Research 
Future research should evaluate how big data management will impact the 
effectiveness of smart city operations, privacy and security measures used in the 
governance of smart communities as the technology continues to progress and becomes 
more pervasive.  
Further study should also look at how culture, trust, and the behavior of a society 
affects populations that have inhabited smart city communities for longer than ten or more 
years. A cultural study that involves the habits of smart communities may help smart city 
planners understand the differences in terms of acceptability of security and privacy 
standards among society. Understanding such differences may help planners more 
accurately insert more effective security and privacy policies in their approaches to the 






                                                 
285 “Community Control Over Police Surveillance,” American Civil Liberties Union, May 3, 2019, 
https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies/community-control-over-police-
surveillance. 
286 American Civil Liberties Union, “Community Control Over Police Surveillance.” 
287 Marlow and Saifuddin, “How to Stop ‘Smart Cities’ From Becoming ‘Surveillance Cities.’”  
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